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Abstract 
Science neither aims at having the monopoly over the truth about the world nor establishing a dogmatic 
knowledge. Natural light of experience is held by empiricists to be the reliable source of human knowledge. 
Inductive logic has been a leading tool of empirical experiments in justifying and confirming scientific theories 
with evidence. Science cannot reach where it has reached without inductive logic. Inductive logic has, therefore, 
played an important role in making science what it is today. Inductive logic helps science to justify its theories 
not form convictional opinions of scientists but from factual propositions. However, inductive logic has been 
problematic in the sense that its logic of justification led philosophers of science to demarcation, the distinction 
of episteme from doxa. At present, some philosophers of science and scientists attempt to justify why science 
carries out a reliable knowledge. Some have argued for structuralism and realism of scientific theories rather 
than believing in the course of miracles and others for their historicity. Both views are explanatories of how 
science works and progresses. This essay recalls the arguments for structures of scientific theories and their 
historicity. First, the essay analyses the controversy between Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper on how the 
problem of inductive logic in confirming scientific theories can be solved. In so doing, the essay refers to 
empirical probabilities as well as the limits calculus. Second, the essay merges frequentist and Bayesian 
approaches to determine how scientific theories are to be confirmed or refuted. Third, the use of a new form of 
Bayesian Theorem will show how mathematical and logical structures respond to some of the important 
questions that arise from the historical and realistic views about scientific theories.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* Corresponding author.  
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The essay argues for epistemic objectivity behind inductive probability, the key issue of the controversy in 
question, and proves that the truth about the world is symmetric. 
Keywords: Science; Induction; Probability; Demarcation; Deduction; Frequentism; Bayesianism. 
1. Introduction 
Nobody has experienced what the future is all about. Despite this fact, inductive intuition seems to inform 
human intellect that the future will resemble the past. Inductive probability will bet that the future will probably 
resemble the past. Still, inductive logic does not assure us that the future will look like the past. It seems obvious 
that “we cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present” [1]. There is an ambivalence about 
predicting the future. In fact, philosophy of science has been aiming to solve such an ambivalence on the ground 
of inductive logic. Yet, inductive logic has been problematic for science despite the accurate results from its 
predictions about the future. Induction rocks the work of science and the nature of scientific knowledge. There is 
an existing debate between Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper on how the problem of inductive logic in 
confirmation theory can be solved. In this essay, I will analyse the Carnap-Popper controversy and argue that the 
controversy is deeper than the problem itself, for it arises not from the problem itself, but from the solutions they 
have proposed to the problem. I shall prove that the Carnapian logic of justification has significantly contributed 
to clarifying the methodological and epistemological implications of inductive logic in admitting well-verified 
scientific theories to be synthetically and analytically true. I will demonstrate that the Popperian logic of 
discovery has instead exposed the methodological challenges of inductive logic in how science establishes its 
theories, but it aims at justification as well. As a result, a new form of Bayesian Theorem which I will explain 
will help me to respond to most of the challenges of inductive logic. The emphasis is on both analytic and 
synthetic statements that provide certain information about the state and the nature of things out there into the 
world.  
2. The Carnap-Popper Controversy and Science with demarcation 
Science is the empirical and systematic inquiry that interprets phenomena of the world. Science relies on 
inductive logic while justifying and confirming its theories not form convictional opinions but from facts. This 
exposition of science may sound too simplistic. Although, it is not obvious due to the role played by inductive 
logic in science. Inductive logic is simply the process of inferring a general law or principle from the 
observation of particular instances [2]. However, inductive logic has been thought to be problematic since its 
reasoning process leads philosophers of science to a harsh demarcation between what is a knowledge and what 
is an opinion, between science and pseudoscience in Popperian perspective. For classical empiricism, only 
factual propositions would constitute factual knowledge, but what could be thought to be non-factual knowledge 
became its central problem [3]. Factual knowledge would be generated from a systematic reasoning built upon 
mathematics and logic. Yet, some scientists were even sceptical about the truth value of factual propositions.  
It is true that “if the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-evident to us, then its self-
evidence in no way justifies our belief in its truth” [1]. For instance, the truth value of my factual propositions 
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without any proofs would depend on my own interpretation. On the one hand, only with factual propositions, 
would I be right to claim that there are things I know that I know, and those I know that I do not know. On the 
other hand, there are things I do not know that I know, and those I do not know that I do not know at all. As a 
result, my knowledge of things is more or less probabilistic and hence ambivalent. Thus, without proofs, factual 
propositions would create an ambivalence about the nature of scientific knowledge. This ambivalence led 
classical empiricism to decline by the fact that the truth value of factual propositions would be probabilistic.  
Due to the decline of classical empiricism, two hypothetical perspectives on the nature of science were 
accredited for two reasons. First, inductive logic problem deprived science of the title of accurate knowledge, 
while remaining a methodological apparatus for scientific researches. Second, due to the problem of inductive 
logic, science seemed to have carried out a fallible and conjectural knowledge. These views gave birth to two 
competing and influential schools of thought in the twentieth century: Neoclassical empiricism and Critical 
empiricism. The first school arises from the writings of Rudolf Carnap, whereas the second is represented by 
Karl Popper [3]. Lakatos has paid attention to their controversy, as if the ultimate solution to the inductive logic 
problem would depend on its resolution.  
Lakatos argues that philosophers of science generate problem-shifts while attempting to solve the inductive 
logic problem. A problem-shift can be either degenerative or progressive. There is a degenerative problem-shift 
when these philosophers create less complex problems than the original one and pay more attention to the lesser 
ones. There is a progressive problem-shift when these philosophers create more complex problems than the 
original one and focus on the complicated ones in order to solve the original one [3]. Lakatos argues that Carnap 
has made a degenerative problem-shift, while Popper seems to have made a more progressive problem-shift. 
Lakatos’ claim should be assessed by clarifying their understanding of probabilities.  
Carnap thinks that the ‘degree of evidential support’ or ‘degree of confirmation’ should somehow be equated 
with probability in the sense of probability calculus in order to classify theories as partially proved or confirmed 
by some facts to a certain degree. Unlike Carnap, Popper holds that one starts with speculative theories and then 
tests them severely for only deductive inferences rather than inductive generalisations [3]. Carnap thought that 
the results of probability calculus would be accurate to some degrees while confirming scientific theories. 
Principles and theorems of inductive reasoning are “analytic but not synthetic. Inductive logic is non-deductive 
and non-demonstrative inference. Inductive logic is the same as inductive probability” [4]. Still, Popper thinks 
that, with probability calculus, a conjectural knowledge would remain conjectural. 
Carnap understands probabilities as parts of the system of inductive logic whose project is to predict the future. 
Frequent observations would help in interpreting the phenomena that take place in the world. For Carnap, 
probability calculus goes far beyond inductive reasoning with logical language based only on sets of factual 
propositions. Probabilistic calculus is meant for another propositional basis grounded on logical measures. In 
fact, Carnapian inductive probability is to be understood within empirical probabilities for a theory of rational 
belief and action [5]. Given the frequency of pieces of evidence proving a given scientific theory true, and the 
total number of the experiments conducted, a mathematical figure could show how best such given theory is to 
be confirmed in order to construct a reliable knowledge.  
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As per Carnapian inductive probability, inductive logic would not be problematic insofar as the background 
knowledge constituted by a dataset of the outcomes of a repeating experience infers to the outcomes of the 
future experience that would depend on the same dataset, and that would constitute a reliable knowledge to be 
held. For example, if I have been trying to heat metals (metal 1, then metal 2, metal 3, metal 4, metal 5) and 
ended up realizing that all of them expand, then I can claim that all metals probably expand on heating. It is a 
probable generalisation because of default of certainty [1]. While carrying out the experiments, I have in mind 
an alternative hypothesis that there could be some metals that cannot expand on heating. This is an idealisation 
in theories [6]. Yet, from my dataset, all the 5 metals I heated have expanded. There is need to figure out if an 
inductive probability can tell us more about the theory. If T stands for the hypothesis that all metals expand on 
heating, e for the evidences that proves T, n for the total number of the experiments conducted, and P for the 
probability that T is true given the evidences e, then Carnapian confirmation of T in a probabilistic figure would 
go as follows: P(T) = e
n
= 5
5
= 1 = 100%. This is only the result based on frequentism in probability. 
Also, the same procedure is applicable to the Popperian notion of the severe-test-theory for degrees of 
confirmation regarded as empirical corroboration [7]. For Popper, corroboration is the best explanation we have 
as we wait for any further evidence to falsify a prior hypothesis. Popper seems to have been concerned with the 
scientific method that would push us to view the world with a blind eye of the mind through observations 
without any preconceived notions. However, whenever we get interested in observing things, there are already 
some kind of preconceptions we tend to have about the things we frequently observe (prior beliefs).  For Popper, 
methods that would only help us to confirm our beliefs are methods of pseudo-sciences because they can help us 
to prove anything. He argues that scientists do not aim to confirm a theory but to disconfirm it while they are 
testing it. For Popper, science works with disconfirmation, whereas pseudo-science works with confirmation. 
However, in the same way, if this Popperian method can serve to disprove anything, it would be therefore 
classified in the set of pseudo-sciences. Due to this Popperian method, the acceptable scientific theories would 
be the one that is to be set on testability yet ready for falsifiability and refutability. In other words, aiming to 
prove scientific hypotheses right would be of no use; all that would be needed is only to prove them wrong. This 
would, however, sound contradictory. In this case, one would have to ask what would be the scientific 
knowledge to be held.  
As a way of adjusting such contradiction, Popper believes that knowledge is all about probabilities and 
contingent upon a dataset.  In Popperian perspective, we are only justified in believing theories that are most 
probable given their dataset. Popper equates Carnapian inductive probability to probability logic that determines 
the degree of probability of a statement [7]. Popper may have misinterpreted Carnapian notion of probability 
calculus. Carnap talks of an “inductive probability of an argument” in confirming a theory on the basis of 
probability calculus. A grade confirmation of a theory is induced from the set of pieces of evidence met during 
the experiments [4]. Hence, such a set is for confirmation of a theory what a set of premises is for the conclusion 
of an argument. While Carnap recognises an “inductive probability of an argument” within the notion of 
probability calculus, Popper realises an “inductive probability of a statement”.    
There is a difference between an “inductive probability” of an argument and that of a statement. An inductive 
probability of an argument is “a measure of the strength of the evidence that the premises provide for the 
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conclusion. It is correct to speak of the inductive probability of an argument, but incorrect to speak of the 
inductive probability of statements” [2]. Carnapian view of inductive probability is rooted in the empirical 
probability, whereas the Popperian one takes roots in the empirical corroboration. The empirical probability 
focuses on the set of pieces of evidence to form an argument for a confirmation of a given scientific theory. Yet, 
the empirical corroboration only targets a particular piece of evidence to get a statement for confirming a given 
scientific theory. Thus, with the aid of an “inductive probability”, the results of an empirical probability might 
differ from those of an empirical corroboration. While empirical probability aims at reaching certainty, 
empirical corroboration cannot, in any case, give up to doubt about the hypotheses it aims to confirm or 
disconfirm with evidence.     
The above example can help us to understand how probability and corroboration differ from each other in the 
empirical approach. If T represents ‘all metals expand on heating’ as a hypothesis to be tested, s the outcomes of 
the tests proving T, r the totality of the tests conducted, and C a corroborative confirmation of theory T, then C 
can be put into a mathematical figure as follows:  C(T) = s
r
= 5
5
= 1. It follows that P(T)  =  C(T). Let this be 
case (1). In pushing further this case, we see the core idea of the Carnap-Popper controversy. If at least one 
metal did not expand while conducting the experiment, then there is a change in the results, and the same would 
also happen if we are to predict that all metals expand on heating. In this case, 4 metals out of 5 expanded. The 
results are as follows: P(T) = e
n
= 4
5
= 0.8   and C(T) = s
r
= 4
5
= 0.8 = 80% . Let this be case (2). As P(T) 
decreases, the hypothesis T is likely to be rejected because it is worthy of confirmation if and only if all the 
gathered pieces of evidence prove it true.   
However, there is need to critically and rationally look at the scenarios of the experiment. An evidence that does 
not confirm the on-test-hypothesis may confirm another hypothesis different from the one on test. The test aims 
at confirming the hypothesis and if it does not, it might confirm something else. Thus, it would be surprising to 
wonder if it is really rational to believe that a non-empty set of possible outcomes will not occur exactly in the 
same way as one believes that the impossible event will not occur [8]. For Jacob Bernoulli, probability is 
epistemic. Everything is objectively certain in the world, even events of the future. Things always have in 
themselves the highest certainty [9].  Here comes in a scenario of complement events. A complement of an 
event stands for all outcomes that are not expected for the event. Together, an event and its complement make 
all possible outcomes. The Complement Rule, as it is attributed to Bernoulli, states that the sum of the 
probability of an event and its complement equals 1. Going back to case (2), since P(T) + P(T′) = 1 by the 
complement rule, then P(T′) = 1 − 0.8 = 0.2 = 20%. This P(T′) is not contradictory to P(T). Instead, P(T′) is 
the degree that is lacking in order to complete the truth value of P(T) at the instance where there are pieces of 
evidence that do not support the hypothesis T on test. It is as the same as the initial probability Pi(T), not in 
terms of prior probability but in terms of the historicity of the theory T. 
At e = 4 and n = 5, P(T) = e
𝑛𝑛
= 4
5
= 0.8 ;  C(T) = s
𝑟𝑟
= 4
5
= 0.8 = 80% = 4.Pi(T) [A] 
At e = 3 and n = 5, P(T) = e
n
= 3
5
= 0.6 ;  C(T) = s
r
= 3
5
= 0.6 = 60% = 3.Pi(T) [B] 
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At e = 2 and n = 5, P(T) = e
n
= 2
5
= 0.4 ;  C(T) = s
r
= 2
5
= 0.4 = 40% = 2.Pi(T) [C] 
At e = 1 and n = 5, P(T) = e
𝑛𝑛
= 1
5
= 0.2 ;  C(T) = s
𝑟𝑟
= 1
5
= 0.2 = 20% = 1.Pi(T) [D] 
An interpretation of [A], [B], [C] and [D] lead us to conclude that P(T) = 5.Pi(T), where 5 is the total number of 
pieces of evidence derived from the 5 experiments carried out. It follows that, at nth experiment, P(T) = n.Pi(T), 
when T is a truth-preserving hypothesis. Let this be case (3). The scenario shows that zero confirmation is 
impossible. It follows what would be called Einsteinian confidence in a theory, since he has never assigned a 
zero prior to his general theory of relativity [10]. In fact, a zero prior would be a total ignorance. Einstein was 
convinced that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to assured results [11]. 
The above example shows that, from case (1) to case (2), the probabilistic confirmation P decreases as the 
number of pieces of evidence (e) decreases. It follows that the confirmability of T decreases as P decreases. In 
this sense, it may appear that Popper wins over Carnap since the probabilistic figure 0 would mean 0 
confirmation. Apparently, it follows that Carnapian logic of justification equated to probability calculus cannot 
account for confirmation of a scientific theory. However, that would be a harsh conclusion. It is important to 
note that even if the mathematical figures tend towards zero, they will never reach an absolute zero. Thus, what 
is at stake in Carnap-Popper controversy is that nonzero corroboration is as possible as a nonzero degree of 
confirmation. In any case, from the above example, e and s do not take a value of zero but a value of 1, because 
at least the first metal has expanded. All experiments were conducted independently from the observed facts at 
the first instance. 
In conducting the experiments, I have at the back of my mind an alternative hypothesis that ‘Not all metals 
expand on heating’. In any case the alternative hypothesis comes true given the results of the experiments, the 
tendency is to refute the prior hypothesis. This begs a question. A critical scientist would want to know why the 
results should be taken as true and confirms the alternative hypothesis. There is no evidence that proves the 
heated metals are real metals as they are assumed to be. There is need to pay more attention on how we name 
things and what our eye of rationalism sees. They may be metals with impurities or may not be metals at all. If 
they were purely metals, they would have expanded while on heating. This is the reason why Carnap suggested 
the idea of probabilities, degrees of evidential support or degrees of confirmation, degrees of rational beliefs, 
and rational betting quotients. This neoclassical chain of identities has been judged by Lakatos as an 
implausibility. He argues that “evidential support cannot be the same as degrees of probability in the sense of 
probability calculus” [3].  
Besides, Lakatos supports Popper claiming that he cuts that neoclassical chain by his notion of corroboration. 
For Lakatos, Popper sets out to prove that the function C(h, e) , evidential support, confirmation, or 
corroboration of h by the evidence e, does not obey the formal calculus of probability in empirical terms [3]. 
Lakatos goes further to show that Carnap shifts from theories to particular instances, degree of confirmation to 
degree of rational belief, judging degree of truth to judging coherence. Lakatos believes that Popper’s model 
appears to progressively advance the growth of science. Popper contended that the work of science is to falsify 
an entire system and that no statement is overturned by falsification. Popper holds that the Logic of falsification 
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needs deductive inferences.  
In contrast, Popper does not deny that if a theory T is true, then the observation O must concord with such a 
theory. However, if O is not observable, then T must be false. This is an entailment with a form of Modus 
Tollens. Here, Popper faces a problem because an entailment takes us back to verify the truth value of premises. 
Not all entailments are logically true. In fact, Popper makes no progress. To get rid of the problem of induction, 
he contended that neither a “simple enumerative induction” nor a “sophisticated inference to the best 
explanation” is necessary to scientific progress. Deduction is sufficient. He paid little attention to how 
falsification or even corroboration can take place within the set of statements in order to target a hypothesis 
under test [12].  
 Furthermore, it is the fact that a “conclusion of a deductive argument” is already set in one of its premises. 
Popper himself admits that deduction is not used simply to prove conclusions; it is rather used as an instrument 
of rational criticism [7]. It seems appropriate to claim that deductive logic can no longer be considered as a 
system that establishes the truth of theories by deducing them from axioms whose truth would be quite certain. 
Instead, deductive logic would be considered as a system that allows us to rationally and subjectively argue for 
our various hypotheses. It aims at explaining them systematically and critically. A confirmation of a hypothesis 
can result from such an explanation [12]. Hence, deductive logic does not tell us the whole truth about a given 
scientific theory or law. Popperian proposal of deductive logic for confirmation leaves us with an ambivalence 
so as the inductive logic does. While a deductivist seems to be speculatively persuasive and strives to reach the 
knowledge through rationalism, an inductivist seems to be realistic with regard to the order of things into the 
world and strives to gain knowledge as an imitator of the world through empiricism. Hence, science progresses 
by the fact that induction as its tools requires a planning agenda in order to reach the accurate results. 
In trying to solve the inductive logic problem, Popperian notion of deductive logic and corroboration fail to 
account for further factors that would hinder the best results of experiments. In fact, an adhocism perceived in 
Carnapian approach comes back to Popperian corroboration. Carnap goes further to suggest that there is need to 
define a measure function in order to satisfy some further factors and conditions that would be associated with 
the experimentation. Carnap refers to Bayesian approach. For instance, once such a function is defined, the 
degree to which a given theory h is confirmed by evidence e can be calculated as follows: P(h│e) = P(h.e)
P(e)   , 
which can also be noted as P(h│e) = P(h∩e)
P(e) . While interpreting Carnapian understanding of probabilities, both 
Popper and Lakatos do not focus on Carnapian Approach to Bayesianism. 
3. Bayesian Approach to Confirmation Theory  
Carnapian approach to Bayesian Theorem makes a lot of sense in confirmation theory. There is need to evaluate 
it and see if it matches with the empirical probability already set above.  If P(h│e) = P(h∩e)
P(e)   , then P(h│e). P(e) = P(h ∩ e) i.e. P(h│e) = P(h∩e)
P(e)   ≡ P(h│e). P(e) = P(h ∩ e) [E]. In a universal set of events h 
and e, conditional and joint probabilities allow the rule P(h ∩ e) = P(e ∩ h) [F]. Given [E] & [F]: P(e ∩ h) =
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P(e│h). P(h)  in Carnapian approach to Bayesianism. P(h│e). P(e) = P(e│h). P(h)  ≡ P(h│e) = P(e|h).P(h)
P(e)  
[Bayesian Theorem]. Carnap does not mean frequentism in his approach to Bayesian Theorem. Bayesianism 
may look like frequentism while interpreting the results of empirical probabilities, but they differ in their 
interpretational use for predictions. There is need to go deeper when it comes to Bayesian interpretation. There 
is need to deeply look at some scenarios.  For P(h│e) = P(e|h).P(h)
P(e) ; P(h) is the prior probability of a given 
hypothesis h; P(e), the expectedness; P(e│h), the likelihood probability provided that h is true; P(h│e), the 
posterior probability of h given the necessary evidence. All these probabilities play a significant role while 
making rational choices and predictive claims.   
Reconsidering the above example, let T replace h. Bayesian Theorem becomes: P(T│e) = P(e|T).P(T)
P(e) . Let this be 
case (4). If T is a truth-preserving scientific theory or law, and given that some unexpected outcomes may occur 
during experimentation, case (3) and case (4) have to be compared: Pi(T) = P(T│e), for P(T│e)  is the posterior 
probability given the occurrence of any particular piece of evidence e.  Since Pi(T) = P(T|e) and Pi(T) =
1
n
. P(T), then P(T) =  n. P(T|e), at nth experiment. Again, since in case (4) P(T|e) = P(e|T).P(T)
P(e) , then P(T) =n. P(e|T).P(T)
P(e) . The probability of T, given an expected outcome (e) does not change the truth value of the 
hypothesis T, because a non-expected outcome (~ e) with respect to the hypothesis T confirms something else 
other than the hypothesis T on test. It would be irrational to think of (~ e) as evidence disconfirming T. 
For future predictions, let (e) and (~ e) be sampled in a set E. For any outcome, E will not change the truth value 
of T. The Bayesian Theorem becomes: P(T|E) = n. P(E|T). P(T)
P(E)  . P (E) being the marginal probability is equal 
to 1, for P(E) = [P(T). P(e|T) + P(~T). P(e|~T)]1+ [P(T). P(e|T)  +  P(~T). P(e|~T)]2 + …[P(T). P(e|T)  + P(~T). P(e|~T)]n which can be also understood as P(E)  =  Cen  in reference to combinatorics in Bernoulli 
trials, for all possible outcomes would come from n trials. The result would be “a theorem of a pure probability 
theory and holds under any interpretation of calculus” [13]. This is so by the fact that either E comes true 
because T is false or E comes true because of other alternative theories. Hence, P(E) can be reasonably washed 
out in order to simplify Bayesian Theorem as follows: P(T│E) = n. P(E│T). P(T), P(T|E) being the posterior 
probability of a theory T being true given the evidences;  P(E|T) being the likelihood probability provided that 
T is true; P(T) the prior probability of T; n being the number of pieces of evidence derived from experiments 
that confirm a theory T; and the formula itself being the Bayesian Product Principle. On the one hand, P(E|T) 
can behave as the prior probability at the first instance while envisaging to keep carrying out various 
independent experiments. On the other hand, P(E|T) can be equivalent to the complement of P(T|E), because P(E|T) can be some falsehood assigned to T being true in itself. T does not change its truth value. As in case 
(2), the probability of a complement is the degree that is lacking in order to fully complete the truth value about 
the hypothesis. Let P(T│E) = n. P(E│T). P(T), the Bayesian Product Principle, be case (5). There still be a 
problem with this Bayesian Product Principle, because P(T) being the prior probability does not necessarily 
equal 1, it must depend on how strongly the experimenter believes in T. 
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It appears that there is need of convention among scientists in confirming T since P(T)  would be always 
assigned a prior probability with personalistic opinions. It is true that the claim ‘all metals expand on heating’ 
seems to be problematic due to the universal quantifier. Yet, the absence of the universal quantifier makes the 
claim more problematic when it is negated. In reference to Poincaré, Hattiangadi argues that there is always a 
choice in taking one hypothesis to be true compared to another and considering it as a principle of physics, for 
instance. For him, whenever physicists consider a particular principle to be true, its truth value must be 
approached as a convention among them, for some would choose another principle and declare it to be equally 
true. He holds that there is no inductive inference that would be valid without appealing to some illicit 
assumptions, for it is derived from a reasoning method from facts to generalities [14]. However, with inductive 
probability, there still be a hope of making sense while seeking a rational confirmability of a given hypothesis. It 
has been already noticed that there is need to reconsider the experiments in any case the evidence does not seem 
to confirm our hypothesis. 
Besides, in some situations where pieces of evidence should have confirmed the hypothesis T, and the case turns 
to be otherwise, those who are pessimistic about inductive reasoning take such situations as puzzles and give up 
to solving the problem. However, giving up would not be a rational choice in any case, for such an attitude 
would reduce our confidence about the hypothesis we believe to be true given the observational facts as well as 
our power over the state and the nature of things in the world. For the hypothesis T [all metals expand on 
heating] must not be true and false at the same time, there is need to note that we have a criterion for judging 
reality as suggested by Hattiangadi. His criterion is that we have “power over nature that gives confidence that 
we have knowledge, and that we are not merely producing empty words” [14]. Thus, it follows that our 
interpretation of the results of an experiment must be informed by our factual observations. 
Considering once more the above example, the experimenter can either assign T a higher probability of 1 if and 
only if he believes T to be true or the experimenter can assign T a lower probability of 0.2, which is rational, 
because that is the lowest probability within the sample of 5 heated-metals. It follows that the posterior 
probability P(T|E) will be always affected by the prior probability P(T). Still, if P(T|E) has to increase because 
of the occurrence of pieces of evidence that confirm T, then it is rational to wash out P(T), for P(T) would keep P(T|E) decreasing and hinder the degree of confirmability of T. For an objectivist and rational empiricist 
committed to verifying T, it is understandable that there must be at least one precedential piece of evidence prior 
to any other pieces of evidence confirming T in order to assign any prior probability to T.  Otherwise, it would 
be irrational to take P(T) as a prior probability. This being the case, then T entails E but not essentially vice 
versa. The probability of E and T, as a joint probability, is given by the product of its marginal probabilities; and 
with n pieces of evidence, P(T) = n. P(E|T). Let this be case (6). The number n plays a role of not having a 
personalistic interpretation of P(T)  because, in any case, P(T)  has to come from somewhere, it is not an 
imaginary probability. Given the cases (5) and (6), the Bayesian Product Principle can be written as follows: P(T|E) = n. P(E|T). n. P(E|T), which is P(T|E) = �n. P(E│T)�2, for at most two experiments. Let us make a 
table of results from the above case with a use of logical interpretation of probability calculus and see what the 
results are like. 
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Table 1 
ei P(E) =  Cen Pi(T) = en P(E|T)  =  P(E). Pi(T) P(T) = n.P(E|T) P(T|E) =�n. P(E|T)�2 
0             1          0                      0          0              0 
1             1          1                      1          1              1 
2             1 1 2⁄  1 2⁄           1              1 
3             1 1 3⁄  1 3⁄           1              1 
4             1 1 4⁄  1 4⁄           1              1 
5             1 1 5⁄  1 5⁄           1              1 
. 
. 
. 
             .                                    
             . 
             . 
          . 
          . 
          . 
                      . 
                      . 
                      . 
          . 
          . 
          . 
              . 
              . 
              .   
 
n 𝐧𝐧!
𝐞𝐞! (𝐧𝐧 − 𝐞𝐞)! 𝟏𝟏𝐧𝐧 𝟏𝟏𝐧𝐧        𝐧𝐧. �𝟏𝟏𝐧𝐧�  �𝐧𝐧. 𝟏𝟏𝐧𝐧�𝟐𝟐 
𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇|𝐸𝐸)  =  �𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸│𝑇𝑇)�2seems to be trivial for it gives us a constant result, which is 1, after some experiments.  
However, it is obvious that all the pieces of evidence are to be derived from the number of experiments 
conducted by an experimenter. In fact, evidence and the truth value of T in themselves are also independent of 
experiments. Hence, since there must be an infinite number of experiments to be conducted, the Bayesian 
Product Principle can be finally written as follows: 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇|𝐸𝐸) = �𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸│𝑇𝑇)�𝑛𝑛, for n takes a number of pieces of 
evidence, and with n experiments, the maximum result will be a constant number, that is 1, at all times. The 
procedure used in the above table cannot tell us much about 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇│𝐸𝐸) = �𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸│𝑇𝑇)�𝑛𝑛 .  However, if the 
structure 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇│𝐸𝐸) = �𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸│𝑇𝑇)�𝑛𝑛  is to be taken as a functional structure and as it must equal to a given 
number within the framework of probability distribution, the range of the results of 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇|𝐸𝐸) can be given by the 
use of limits, for they are fundamental to calculus. The application of limits calculus to the Bayesian Product 
Principle is of great importance, for it can helps us to understand where should lie our confidence in T. 
𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇│𝐸𝐸) =𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛→[0;±∞]�𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸|𝑇𝑇)�𝑛𝑛 ≡ 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇|𝐸𝐸) = �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛→0�𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸|𝑇𝑇)�𝑛𝑛     (1)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛→±∞�𝑛𝑛.𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸|𝑇𝑇)�𝑛𝑛  (2) 
A) From the equation (1), P(T|E) = limn→0�n. P(E|T)�n, and  n. P(E|T) can also be written as 𝑒𝑒ln�n.P(E|T)� 
P(T|E) = limn→0�𝑒𝑒ln� n.P(E|T)��n= lim𝑛𝑛→0 𝑒𝑒n.ln �n.P(E|T)� = 𝑒𝑒limn→0 ln�n.P(E|T)�1n  
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 =  𝑒𝑒limn→0 ΔΔn �ln�n.P(E|T)��ΔΔn �1n�  = 𝑒𝑒limn→0 1n.P(E|T)− 1n2 (by differentiation)   
 = 𝑒𝑒limn→0 −n2[for P(E│T) = 1
n
  from the table] 
 = 𝑒𝑒−(0)2  = 1  
From the equation (2), P(T|E) = limn→±∞�n. P(E|T)�n = 𝑒𝑒limn→±∞−n2   
        = 𝑒𝑒−(±∞)2= 0  
B) In case P(E|T) straightly takes a value of 1
𝑛𝑛
, an application of limits calculus to the Bayesian Product 
Principle, P(T|E) = �n. P(E│T)�n, generates a uniform distribution. 
 P(T|E) = limn→[0;±∞]�n. P(E│T)�n ≡ PT|E) =  limn→[0;±∞] �n. 1n�n ≡ P(T|E) = � limn→0(1)nlimn→±∞(1)n = 1 
 
Figure 1 
From the equation (1) and (2), the Bayesian Product Principle is to be understood within the framework of 
probability distribution as P(T|E) = limn→[0;±∞]�n. P(E|T)�n. With n pieces of evidence to be met, the results of P(T|E) remain between zero and 1, which can also be written as  0 ≤ P(T|E) ≤ 1. It may be difficult to 
understand how P(T|E) should be 1 with zero evidence in probability distribution. The fact is that computational 
mathematics has access to the sense of what the value of zero as a number is all about. In the sense of 
probability calculus, zero evidence is not interpreted in the sense of nothingness per se. This is understood in 
twofold. First, zero evidence is the degree given by the ratio of that single particular or targeted piece of 
evidence over the totality of all possible pieces of evidence summed together. Second, zero evidence is that 
absolute proportion of each and every single piece of evidence in the totality of all outcomes of the possible 
experiments to be conducted.  In this sense, all particular pieces of evidence are equally proportional within their 
universal set of evidence. In a uniform distribution, each and every particular piece of evidence makes the 
calculated probability 1 when its own value is well understood in its functional contribution to the absolute total 
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value.  
The concept of zero evidence can also mean that initial position of an experimenter who starts to question 
whether what is believed to be true is really true or not. This can be interpreted in two related ways. Either an 
observation proves a theory true and an experimenter begins to falsify it, or an observation does not prove a 
theory true and an experimenter strives by all means to reach at the truth value of a theory. For instance, T to be 
true at the first instance, the experimenter does not set any pieces of evidence, only experiments come to meet 
them, for they are already out there in the world. In addition, once the pieces of evidence are known from the 
course of observations before they prove true a given theory, predictions can be made with no puzzles. All 
observations are to be detected within the framework of probability distribution from a dataset with n 
experiments. The concept of zero evidence is just rationalized, it can be in the mind of the experimenter with no 
scrutiny, but it does not exist on its own. Zero evidence is the rate provided by a single piece of evidence over 
the totality of all pieces of the necessary evidence. If the p-value is low, the prior hypothesis is either rejected or 
accepted and if the p-value is high, the alternative hypothesis is either accepted or rejected or vice versa. Here 
comes in a dilemma that is to be only solved by the objectivism of the experiments noting that all pieces of the 
necessary evidence are uniformly proportional and converge to the same absolute value. 
The application of limits calculus to the Bayesian Product Principle proves how and why the past and the future 
are symmetrical with respect to the present, because the results of the before and the after some pieces of 
evidence converge into those of the present. The past and the future are, in fact, embedded into the present. The 
past is made present by reminiscence and the future by the awaiting. The same application also proves that zero 
knowledge about the world is impossible.  
The Bayesian Product Principle P(T|E) = �n. P(E│T)�n is a uniform distribution as a mathematical structure 
that provides a necessary truth but empty of sense without the mind of a truth-seeker that makes use of it in 
order to reach at the accurate results derived from facts. This is the nature of mathematics. In my case, it is a 
mathematical structure that is designed for analytic statements about the nature of things in the world; an 
application of limits calculus to it generates a uniform distribution and proves that the truth about the world is 
intrinsically uniform. It is also designed for synthetic statements about the state of things out there in the world. 
In this case, an application of limits calculus to it generates an exponential curve of probability distribution 
which can help us to justify how the truth about the nature of things in the world is symmetric and give us the 
interval of confidence we have in a given scientific theory after some tests or experiments. 
Given the conditions, the state of things into the world can change with time, whereas their nature is inherent. 
Hence, the nature of a thing is intrinsic while its state is extrinsic. Logics has been employed in coming up with 
the Bayesian Product Principle, which is the method of logical positivism as well. An attempt to analyse 
mathematics and logics with the purpose of constructing a factual knowledge from observational and theoretical 
statements has been the work of logical positivism. In as much as the sense-based statements and theoretical 
entities prove and say something about the world, the mathematical and logical structures derived from them 
should be analytically applicable to the descriptive aspect of things in the world. Logical positivism takes 
seriously inductive logic for the fact that an inductive argument proves itself to be ampliative since the content 
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of its conclusion goes far beyond the content of its premises. 
4. Science with Structuralism and its Historicity 
In logical positivism perspective, stating that ‘All metals expend on heating [T]’ would be as meaningful as 
stating that ‘Not all metals expand on heating [~T]’. Both [T] and [~T] are verifiable, and even the above 
Bayesian Product Principle can also prove them to be analytically true. An approach like this would be, 
however, irrational because there is no use of facts in stating [T] and [~T], for there seems to be no relation 
between the two; each of them is on its own. Such a scenario is due to the inductive dilemma. Since logical 
positivism leaves the meaning of a statement into dilemma, a new school of thought attempted to get rid of that 
dilemma. The attempt was done by separating the logical methodology of science from its history and 
distinguishing the theoretical aspects of language from the observational ones based on the analysis of facts. 
This has also been the Popperian approach to Carnapian approach with regard to Bayesianism. Logical 
empiricism came in as the redeemer of the scientific knowledge left dilemmatic, but it could not account for 
theories made about the unobservable entities. Hence, there seems to be no rationality and objectivity in 
confirming scientific theories.  
In showing how science works with irrationality and subjectivity, Thomas Kuhn argues that science works with 
paradigm-shifts. He demonstrates how scientific revolution takes place in a way that is similar to what arises out 
of political revolution in the political community. Consistent with Kuhn, due to the paradigm-shifting 
occurrences in the scientific community, scientific revolution is a “noncumulative developmental episode in 
which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by incompatible new one” [15]. Kuhnian idea on the 
scientific revolution is that it is analogous to political revolution in the sense that in both types of revolution 
newer ideas come to replace either wholly or partly the older ones. 
In political revolutions, institutional changes happen when new institutions come to replace old ones. In the 
same way, scientific revolution occurs when a new paradigm replaces in whole or in part an old paradigm. In 
assessing the nature of the scientific revolution, Kuhnian contribution needs to be appreciated, for the fact that a 
scientific revolution seems to be more accurate in the sense of non-cumulativeness than its sense of 
cumulativeness. For instance, in my case, it is not reasonable to accept [T] and [~T] at the same time as theories 
that describe the same reality. The hypothesis ‘all metals expand on heating’ survives to some extent its 
negation ‘it is not the case that all metals expand on heating’. On the contrary, the hypothesis ‘some metals 
expand on heating’ does not survive the implications of its negation ‘it is not the case that some metals expand 
on heating’. Yet, the removal of the universal and existential quantifiers makes the hypothesis ‘metals expand 
on heating’ worthless when it is negated. All these scenarios show that there is a need to assess how accurate is 
Kuhn’s contribution to science. 
In agreement with Kuhn, it seems obvious that scientific revolution can be seen as one kind of revolution that 
takes place in a way political revolution does. However, if I am to look at the process of these types of 
revolutions, there are more dissimilarities than similarities that make one different from the other in nature and 
procedure. It is noticeable that, in politics, there is no rational or logical basis in favouring one institution over 
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another, because the values of each institution are different from those of the other. In a political community, 
each and every group argues for its own values, there is no objective reason in adopting one institution and 
leaving behind others. Everything is done in a persuasive manner. For instance, dictatorship and democracy do 
not share the same values. Once one wins over another, it cuts off itself from the political ideas of the other. In 
this respect, any winning institution practically tries to persuade the political community. Thus far, in 
questioning Kuhnian idea on scientific revolution, one may want to know whether the case of institutional 
changes in the political community is the same as in the scientific community. 
To disagree with Kuhn, it is obvious that the processes of revolution in science are not the same as in politics. I 
am convinced that the scientific community works with objective reason, rational and logical basis in picking 
one paradigm over another. When it comes to the problem-solving of the paradigms-shifting, there is no such a 
thing as persuasion in science as it is the case for the institutional changes in politics. In picking one paradigm 
over another, the scientific community refers to its value and promising solutions to the prevailing scientific 
problem. When a paradigm replaces another, not everything from an old paradigm collapses, the new one has to 
have certain truth values and reliable views in connection with those of the old one. For instance, Cartesian 
explanation of gravitation, Newtonian Formulation of gravitation and Einstein theory of gravitation are 
commonly grounded on the force that draws objects towards their center. This being the case, my question is to 
know whether Kuhn suggested that scientists are guided by paradigm shifts without rules and if his idea of non-
cumulativeness still holds. 
In the scientific community, there are shared values in adopting paradigms either old or new ones, such as 
accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness or progressiveness. These are five characteristics of a 
good theory later suggested by Thomas Kuhn himself in his response to the criticisms of the portrayal he gave to 
the scientific revolution. For a newer paradigm to be adopted by the scientific community, it needs to be 
consistent with and relevant to the views about an old paradigm on a given investigated scientific theory or 
principle within the domain to which it is more appropriate. If this is the case, then a question that comes in here 
is that one may want to know why Kuhnian portrayal of the scientific revolution is non-cumulative. In the end, 
efficiency and convenience have to complete the five values for the sake of scientific evolution. Thus, science 
does not need a revolution, but an evolution. 
Unlike Thomas Kuhn, the logical empiricists believed that science was objective and rational. The only accurate 
method in choosing a reliable theory among competing theories was to use the lab and observe the results of 
their experiments for a better interpretation. The problem of justification could be sorted out through 
mathematics and logic. The language could be sorted out and all unobservable facts should be relegated and 
oriented to the realm of metaphysics. In this sense, science progresses cumulatively, because the results of 
theories could complement one another for the growth of science. However, in [16], Kuhn challenges the picture 
of science painted by the logical empiricists. Kuhnian approach is that the true picture of the way science works 
can be seen by studying the history of science. Such a study would show that science does not progress 
cumulatively but through various revolutions. In time of revolutions, experiments, observations, mathematics, 
logic, or language itself cannot help scientists to choose between paradigms because paradigms are 
incommensurable. Again, this view seems to have painted the picture of science as being non-objective and non-
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rational. 
Additionally, Bayesian Theorem has been applied to how the logic and history of science can be merged. For 
instance, Wesley Salmon argues that Bayesian Theorem provides some aid in bridging the gap between Logical 
empiricism and Kuhn’s historical approach on Theory Choice. Salmon suggests that there is need to possibly 
take an algorithm from logical empiricism and interpret its values with the aid of the historical approach. For 
him, an algorithm is simply a set of rules or formula. For instance, if logical empiricism has come up with a bold 
theory like ‘all metals expand on heating’, the algorithm that may confirm the degree of our beliefs in such a 
theory can be given in a probabilistic figure. Thus, we could use the tools of historical approach to tell ourselves 
what conditions sin qua none should be envisaged for a particular metal to expand on heating. In this sense, 
scientists can restore elements of rationality and objectivity in science. 
Salmon maintains that an objectivist interpretation would consider the history of science and make use of 
rational arguments while interpreting Bayesian Theorem with regard to Theory Choice. As Salmon suggests, 
three criteria can account for objectivity while evaluating prior probabilities: pragmatic, formal and material. 
Pragmatic criteria would look at the circumstances under which a given theory is adopted, formal criteria would 
consider its consistency and material criteria would evaluate the content of a theory to be sure that there is no 
contradiction. These criteria also incorporate Kuhn’s criteria of simplicity and consistency as well as the account 
of the history of science.   
Salmon takes logical empiricism to be dependent on algorithms in the form of Bayesian Theorem. The idea is 
that the values of the algorithm could be well interpreted with the aid of Kuhn’s criteria and reference to history 
and experience. Nevertheless, due to the threshold of shifting-ratios as well as the catchall hypothesis for 
alternative hypotheses, the Bayesian algorithm that Salmon came up with cannot accurately account for a theory 
which is to be held as true compared to others. An objective interpretation of Bayesian Theorem seems to 
contain both rationality and objectivity. I agree with Salmon that if the criteria for objectivity are followed and 
reference is made to scientific experience and frequency, then different scientist can act rationally and 
objectively even if they might have different prior probabilities. Ultimately, as Salmon observes, a ‘washing 
out’ may occur when the differences in prior probabilities are resolved by increasing confidence in a given 
scientific theory. This is in the same line as what I have done in order to came up with what I have called the 
Bayesian Product Principle. Salmon holds that Bayesian Algorithm can help scientific community to rationally 
and objectively choose one theory among competing theories. However, there is still the question of how to 
evaluate the likelihoods. 
The likelihood checks the impact of the evidence against the truth of the theory. For a deterministic theory, the 
evidence must concur with the theory. From the above example, if the theory ‘all metals expand on heating’ is 
proven true, then the evidence from the experiment on metal 1 must be that metal 1 expands on heating. Thus P(E|T) must be 1. If the evidence from the experiment is that metal 1contracts on heating, then the theory must 
be false since it contradicts clear evidence. In this case, P(E|T)  must be 0. But what if the result of the 
experiment is false. This would make our calculation of the likelihood more complicated. Salmon suggests that 
when such a scenario happens, we shall allow for what he calls plausible scenarios. Scientists should look for 
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plausible reasons why evidence E is contradicting the theory T. If they can find such plausible reasons, then they 
can raise the likelihood of the theory from 0, thus saving the theory. These plausible scenarios in themselves 
have the potential to increase our knowledge of the world. In seeking for the proof of these plausible scenarios, 
we may arrive at information which we lacked before. Hence, this method accounts for Kuhn’s criteria of 
fruitfulness.  
It is important to note that Kuhn’s criteria of simplicity and consistency have also been touched upon in the 
discussion on prior probabilities. This leaves behind the criteria of scope and accuracy which are not clarified 
enough to be used as criteria in making judgements on theory choice. As response, Salmon proposes three 
grades for rationality [17]. First, there is need to avoid logical contradictions and incoherent probabilities, for the 
presence of either constitutes a form of irrationality: “static rationality”. Second, there is a “kinematic 
rationality” that merges static rationality and the rule of Bayesian conditionalization for a stronger type of 
rationality. Bayesian conditionalization requires a person to revise her prior probabilities in the light of new 
evidence. But the personalist can simply avoid this revision by choosing to change the values of prior 
probability. Third, there is a “dynamic rationality” that fuses kinematic with objectivist interpretation. This is 
the highest grade of rationality given that it is based on some form of objectivity. With this “dynamic 
rationality”, Salmon appears to have partially responded to Kuhn’s question on the role of rationality in the 
choice between competing scientific theories.      
As a result, Salmon recommends an objective interpretation of Bayesian Theorem which seems to contain both 
rationality and objectivity. Salmon, however, admits that there are problems which his approach does not fully 
address. These include the question of incommensurable paradigms and the sameness of a background 
knowledge. Despite these persisting challenges, he believes that Bayesian Theorem can at least help both parties 
to realise that they share some common ground. Salmon’s plan is to build a bridge between logical empiricism 
and Kuhn’s historical approach, which is more or less a Popperian rationalistic approach.    
Besides the work of Salmon, a historical approach to science has been evaluated in comparison with Scientific 
Realism. John Worrall argues that structural realism is the best way to go in bridging the gap between Scientific 
Realism and the historical view of radical change in theories [18]. Unlike Worrall, Psillos argues that despite the 
challenges posed to Scientific Realism over the years, it is still a tenable position to hold onto and its epistemic 
optimism is justified [19]. Their arguments are closely related to some extent and their aim is to come up with a 
more unfailing structure of the scientific realism that would be a reliable ground of scientific theories. They 
have tried to establish such a kind of structure, but it may raise some questions. 
With structures only, scientific realism would be problematic insofar as it cannot be trusted as a source of true 
scientific theories that can tell us the truth about the world. Structures do not necessary “conform to the 
linguistic habits inferred from the evidence, and even stable linguistic habits are not automatically boundaries of 
sense, because long-lasting empirical beliefs can be and often have been corrected by new discoveries” [20]. We 
cannot know whether the unobservable posited by science actually exist or not. For instance, Einstein’s Theory 
of space and time, String Theory and Theories about DNA are of the unobservable. We may not know that they 
really exist. It is unreasonable to base our explanation of all those theories on miracles or to believe them as true 
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scientific theories. Yet, because we cannot easily accept miracles, believing in true predictive theories is the best 
way to go. It is better to believe, with scientific structures, that theories are true rather than believing in the idea 
of miracles. 
However, if we are to look at the course of the history of science, scientific theories have not always been true. 
Ptolemian System has been replaced by Copernican System. Newtonian gravitation has been challenged by 
Einsteinian notion of gravity. It is reasonable to believe that even newer theories will be proved false in the 
future. Thus, we should not take scientific theories to be true, because there may be proven false at a particular 
time. This is, in fact, a result of the separability assumption which is “not only part of science but also of non-
scientific traditions” [20]. The fact is that we cannot know the truth content of the world, but we can only posit 
that which helps us to make sense out of what we experience. Whatever the aim of the scientist, he cannot attain 
the whole truth about the world. Yet, it has been experienced that newer theories take some elements from old 
ones. Paul Feyerabend seems to have agreed with that by claiming that “theories, facts, and procedures that 
constitutes the scientific knowledge of a particular time are assumed to be the results of specific and highly 
idiosyncratic historical developments” [20]. There must be a kind of continuity between theories and a relation 
between phenomena. All we need is the structure of science. 
As stated by Stathis Psillos, scientific realism is currently constituted of three main theses that seem to make it 
“attractive due to the balance of feasibility and dignity it offers to our quest of knowledge” [19]. First, the 
metaphysical thesis (metaphysical realism) states that “the world has a definite and mind-independent structure” 
[19]. If this were the case, what would be the rationale of holding onto scientific theories? What would be the 
role of human intellect in search of knowledge? What would be knowledge? The idea behind this first thesis is 
to “distinguish scientific realism from all the anti-realist accounts of science” [19]. Second, the semantic thesis 
(semantic realism) states that “scientific theories must be taken at face value as they are truth conditioned 
descriptions of their intended domain, both observable and unobservable. Hence, they are capable of being true 
or false”. If this were the case, how come some scientific predictions come true? Where lies the problem? This 
second thesis intends to “make scientific realism different from eliminative instrumentalism and reductive 
empiricist accounts” [19] or pragmatic anti-realism. Third, the epistemic thesis (epistemic optimism) states that 
“mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well confirmed and approximately true of the world” 
[19]. If this were the case, could not there be some other ways of coming up with the truth about the world 
without relying on scientific theories? The third thesis distinguishes “scientific realism from agnostic or 
sceptical accounts of empiricism” [19], which is the Popperian perspective as well. The scientist aims at getting 
to truth about the world, but he may never know if he has attained such a truth.    
As Psillos, Worrall believe that the “best defense of realism is to try to synthesize the historical record with 
some form of realism” [19]. Worrall’s way of doing this synthesis is to posit “Structural Realism”. Though, 
Psillos does not believe that structural realism is a tenable position. He seems to hold onto some optimism that 
there is a way to show that radical change in theories does not compromise the continuity of the truth about the 
world. Worrall does not seem to believe that any position other than the one on structural realism is tenable. He 
calls into question the concepts used by optimistic realists such as approximation towards truth, cumulativeness. 
It would make some sense to bring into question the optimism of Psillos and the synthesis of Worrall as a way 
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of responding to questions that arise from the notion of structural realism in science. It seems that a number of 
questions still needs to be responded to before any form of realism can be legitimately held. Even at present, 
scientific theories can either succeed or fail. There is still a long way to go in order to have unfailing structures 
of science. Despite this fact, through logical empiricism, structures are possible.   
Inductive probability, or induction in general, still has a role to play in the work of science. In fact, “laws and 
theories that make up scientific knowledge are derived by induction from a factual basis supplied by 
observations and experiments. Once such general knowledge is available, it can be drawn on to make 
predictions and offer accurate explanations” [21].  In other words, scientific theories and laws are induced from 
facts gathered with observations while predictions and explanations are deduced from scientific theories and 
laws generally well-accepted. Facts are prior to theories and independent of theories. They are reliable 
foundations of scientific knowledge. The Bayesian Product Principle, P(T|E) = �n. P(E|T)�n, has been induced 
from facts and it proves inductive probability to be reliable foundations of predictions and hence scientific 
knowledge. It helps to weigh the truth value of theories while picking one over another. It can be part of 
universal principles the science contains in its restricted universality framework, even if the universality of 
science does not mean that all scientific theories or laws are universally true and all its methods universally 
applicable [18]. Its objective interpretation requires a clear understanding of joint and conditional probabilities. 
There is need to note that P(T|E) does not necessarily mean P(T ∩ E) in Bayesian approach to probabilities. P(T ∩ E) is calculated within the framework of coherent probabilistic structures. P(T|E) is calculated within the 
framework of a systematisation of certain normative principles of rationality. It follows that scientific theories 
cannot be objects of beliefs, but only formal arrangements for organising events and their degrees of beliefs [5]. 
The above Bayesian Product Principle satisfies the concomitant claims of Bernoulli and Einstein. Bernoulli’s 
claim about the objective certainty of things in the world is confirmed by Einstein who claimed that the 
discovery of a universal formal principle can lead us to assured results. By arguing in the same line with 
Bernoulli and Einstein, I am claiming that all metals that participate in the same reality [let it be called Metal-
ness] should expand on heating, for each metal heated under normal conditions should expand and by expanding 
would reflect the same reality: the nature of metals and their physical reactions while on heating. Inductive 
probability has a lot to say about the world. Things are uniformly ordered into the world. There is no need of 
fracturing the knowledge we get from the observational facts of a repeated experiment. It is up to us to revise the 
experiment whenever we get the unexpected results. What is true remains true no matter what the results from 
experimentation might be, meaning that truth remains truth no matter what a human intellect can achieve. There 
is no problem with inductive probability and, hence, with induction in general. The problem of induction lies in 
our convictions and not in our logical argument about the truth of the nature of things into the world. If it is the 
nature of metals to expand on heating, human intellect cannot change that reality. Our observations inform our 
experimentations while confirming or disconfirming scientific theories. Scientific theories are explanations of 
laws of nature. Science succeeds where it works in accordance with the laws of nature. Science should revise its 
methods where it has failed. The role of inductive probability is to bring about simplicity in human intellect for 
an epistemic objectivity. I define epistemic objectivity as a relational understanding of observational facts and 
their rational and objective interpretations. 
5. Conclusion  
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In this essay, I have discussed that the Carnapian understanding of probabilities was misunderstood and 
unvalued by Popper and then misjudged by Lakatos. Their arguments are both for justification and confirmation 
of scientific theories. There is no such thing as discovery in Popperian perspective. I have demonstrated how the 
logic of discovery goes back to look at how scientific theories come about, which is inadequate to solving the 
problem of induction. The Popperian perspective is closely related to Kuhnian perspective, they are both parts of 
the historical view of change in scientific theories. The problem of inductivism is equated to the problem of 
demarcationism. It is, in fact, the problem of drawing a line of demarcation between those hypotheses which 
could be properly described as belonging to empirical science, and others which might possibly be described as 
pseudo-scientific” [22]. Popper’s concern is due to the subjectivity and objectivity of science that Michael 
Polanyi has even referred to in his arguments for personal and tacit knowledge [24]. 
Besides, the problem of demarcation goes even backwards to Aristotle’s credentials on whether a statement is 
scientific or not [23]. Popper thinks that the criterion of verifiability, adopted by logical positivists, including 
Rudolf Carnap, was inadequate for demarcation [22]. He appropriately intended to contrast it with his own 
criterion, but he failed to do so due to his denial of inductive reasoning. Even his appeal to some sort of 
scientific convention for the short-term acceptance (prior acceptance) of theories, based on their corroboration 
(posterior acceptance) with our understanding of the world (reliability) through probabilistic hypotheses does 
not solve the problem. Popper indicates that “every test of a theory, that results either in its corroboration or 
falsification must stop at some basic statement which we decide to accept” [22]. For him, if a statement or 
theory has not been falsified, our tendency is to accept it as convention for the sake of scientific growth. 
The Popperian approach prioritises growth over reliability. It shifts the emphasis from ‘acceptance to reliability’ 
and from ‘reliable’ to ‘more reliable than’ [3]. Is growth without reliability a good measure of scientific 
progress? Lakatos pointed out that “the most rigorous observance of the Popperian method may lead us away 
from the truth, accepting false and refuting true laws” [3]. Given this assertion, would it really be logical to 
assume that corroboration is directly proportional to the truth content of scientific hypotheses? Are there no 
other ways of solving the problem of induction without making problem-shifts? The logic of justification and 
that of discovery as well as the historical approach face that same problem. But The methods of justification 
differ from the methods of discovery. It is not unreasonable to believe that Carnapian inductive logic is 
empirically progressive. Structures that make science stands for reliable knowledge are possible.  
The new form of Bayesian Theorem−the Bayesian Product Principle− is the structure of its own kind in Theory 
Choice. For if metals are as they are in themselves and by their nature, it is not understandable and clear to 
justify why and how we cannot hold that ‘all metals expand on heating’, once verified but not falsified, is true. 
And from this assertion, every other verified scientific theory or law follows. It is true that “there is a wider area 
of personal judgment in every verification of a scientific theory. Contrary to current opinion, it is not the case 
that a proven discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed data suffices in itself to invalidate a 
theory” [24]. Our understanding of the world depends in no way on the falsifiability of our beliefs, but only on 
the accuracy of their justification. In fact, the Popperian perspective is a reductionist, which turns popper’s 
deductive inferences into circular reasoning, because any unfalsifiable scientific theory would not come true. 
True scientific theories are true, not because they are falsifiable, but because they work in accordance with the 
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natural order of things into the world.  
Carnap-Popper controversy has been animated by the difference of the Carnapian understanding of the 
epistemic objectivity embedded in the inductive probability and the Popperian corroboration approach. While 
for Carnap the truth about the world seems to be analytic, for Popper it is asymptotic. Yet, the analytic and 
asymptotic conceptions of the truth about the world do not contradict one another for an objectivist truth-seeker, 
they rather complement one another. Both views give room to epistemic objectivity in science through empirical 
experiences. Had it not been the epistemic objectivity behind the predictions of science through the so-called 
inductive logic problem, science would not have made progress. As Ayer put it “the very way we go about 
making basic observations is deeply rooted in induction, noting that we acquire the habit of accepting certain 
statements as the result of having the appropriate experiences” [25]. The controversy in question cannot be of no 
use, it is a part of a reappraisal of scientific theories and that is what makes scientific knowledge factual 
knowledge, a knowledge that may be approached under various angles with an objectivist eye of the mind, a 
nondogmatic knowledge but truth-preserving given the domain in which it is applied. To complete both Carnap 
and Popper, within the framework of probability distribution, the new form of Bayesian Theorem proves that 
truth about the world is symmetric, meaning that the future looks like the past in virtue of the natural and 
relational order of things into the world. 
Confirmatory approach, discovery approach, and historical approach to scientific theories cannot fully overcome 
the mistakes of the past for future predictions. None of these three approaches can accurately account for the 
best theory, only an epistemic justification can do so. Therefore, a methodological prospective through 
empiricism is far better than a critical retrospective through rationalism, even if they may inform one another. 
Carnapian approach to Bayesian Theorem is successful in how scientific theories can be confirmed or refuted. 
The Bayesian Product Principle proves Carnap successful in trying to overcome the problem of induction. It 
deepens the optimism of Psillos and Worrall about scientific realism and structural realism respectively. It 
proves that numberless pieces of evidence are not necessarily important while holding onto a given scientific 
theory, because as we increase the number of experiments in order to meet as many as possible pieces of 
evidence, we may tend to deny those we have already met by relying on those which do not confirm a given 
scientific theory under test. In fact, we may also confuse true pieces of evidence and false ones. Popper is not 
completely wrong when he thinks that knowledge is all about probability and contingency upon a dataset. 
The Bayesian Product Principle does not demonstrate that probability is deterministic, but that what we ought to 
know about the nature of things in the world is deterministic. Nor does the Bayesian Product Principle intend to 
show that our knowledge of the world is deterministic but that what there is to know about the world is already 
set out there into the world. The Bayesian Product Principle proves that we are only justified in believing things 
that are most probable given the dataset. Truth may not be possible at the first place, but all we need is to always 
revise our beliefs and improve our knowledge of things into the world. The Bayesian Product Principle may also 
conform with the related predictions of Bernoulli and Einstein about the “objective certainty of things in the 
world” and the “discovery of a universal formal principle” that can lead us to assured results. It proves that 
things are as they are in themselves, before we even discover them out there in the world.  
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The Bayesian Product Principle proves that the overgeneralized problem of inductive logic is both a 
methodological and epistemological problem of our quest of certainty about our knowledge of the world. The 
use of both empiricism and rationalism does not address such a problem. It is obvious that one may only want to 
be empiricist and yet remains uncertain about the knowledge we ought to have about the world. In the same line, 
one may only want to be rationalist and yet again remains sceptical about the necessary knowledge of what there 
is to know about the world. The problem with both empiricism and rationalism is that they pay inadequate 
attention to the objective aspect of scientific findings, both tend to remain at the level of phenomenalism and 
psychologism. Hence, we do not only need to be empiricists and rationalists but also and above all objectivists.  
Both empiricism and rationalism are grounded on Objectivism. This being the case, it is obvious that one may 
fix biased objectives to be reached at either through empiricism or rationalism. In this sense, all that is to come 
as results may depend on what the senses may be able to capture and what the reason may be able to tell about 
the same results through interpretation. In essence, both empiricism and rationalism are intertwined and inform 
each other in virtue of essential objectivism. By this notion of essential objectivism, I mean, in rigorous use of 
the term, that notion of the necessary aspect of objectivity of every kind of reasoning process free from any sort 
of subjective objectivity in our quest of truth and knowledge about the world. Truth in the sense of what there is 
to know and knowledge in the sense of what is known about the world should be objectively approached with no 
hunches of both empiricists and rationalists. Truth and knowledge about the world are essentially unique. 
Therefore, in its very sense, objectivism is to be essentially spoken of both that non-trivial reasoning process and 
non-differential interpretation of the evidence in guaranteeing the accuracy of findings in our quest of truth and 
knowledge about the world. Therefore, in verifying the truth value of scientific theories or laws, neither 
empiricism nor rationalism sets out evidence on their own. The evidence is met through experimentation and 
testing founded on Objectivism. 
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Bayesian Product Principle does not respond to the challenges which might be raised from inductive reasoning 
that cannot be formalised. For instance, it does not address the questions that arise from the statements to be 
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Nor does this study respond to the equivocality of coins-tossing or dices-tossing claimed to be fair and any other 
forms of chance-game of the kind due to their lack of objectivity within the framework of probability calculus. It 
is, then, suggested that further studies about the objectivity that may eventually be found in the inductive 
reasoning with statements only based on unobservable entities in the world need to be conducted. This study 
only puts an emphasis on verifiable analytic and synthetic statements about the nature and the state of things that 
are to be found out there in the world. An understanding of the results of this study as well as their application to 
other possible queries on the problem of inductive logic must not be overgeneralised but can still be more 
explored for further researches on the generalised problem of induction, particularly within the domain of 
philosophy of science. 
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